# Definition:Logical Implication

## Definition

In a valid argument, the premises **logically imply** the conclusion.

If the truth of one statement $p$ can be shown in an argument directly to cause the meaning of another statement $q$ to be true, then $q$ follows from $p$ by **logical implication**.

We may say:

In symbolic logic, the concept of **logical consequence** occurs in the form of semantic consequence and provable consequence.

In the context of proofs of a conventional mathematical nature on $\mathsf{Pr} \infty \mathsf{fWiki}$, the notation:

- $p \leadsto q$

is preferred, where $\leadsto$ can be read as **leads to**.

### Semantic Consequence

Let $\mathscr M$ be a formal semantics for a formal language $\LL$.

Let $\FF$ be a collection of WFFs of $\LL$.

Let $\map {\mathscr M} \FF$ be the formal semantics obtained from $\mathscr M$ by retaining only the structures of $\mathscr M$ that are models of $\FF$.

Let $\phi$ be a tautology for $\map {\mathscr M} \FF$.

Then $\phi$ is called a **semantic consequence of $\FF$**, and this is denoted as:

- $\FF \models_{\mathscr M} \phi$

That is to say, $\phi$ is a **semantic consequence of $\FF$** if and only if, for each $\mathscr M$-structure $\MM$:

- $\MM \models_{\mathscr M} \FF$ implies $\MM \models_{\mathscr M} \phi$

where $\models_{\mathscr M}$ is the models relation.

Note in particular that for $\FF = \O$, the notation agrees with the notation for a $\mathscr M$-tautology:

- $\models_{\mathscr M} \phi$

The concept naturally generalises to sets of formulas $\GG$ on the right hand side:

- $\FF \models_{\mathscr M} \GG$

if and only if $\FF \models_{\mathscr M} \phi$ for every $\phi \in \GG$.

### Provable Consequence

Let $\mathscr P$ be a proof system for a formal language $\LL$.

Let $\FF$ be a collection of WFFs of $\LL$.

Denote with $\map {\mathscr P} \FF$ the proof system obtained from $\mathscr P$ by adding all the WFFs from $\FF$ as axioms.

Let $\phi$ be a theorem of $\map {\mathscr P} \FF$.

Then $\phi$ is called a **provable consequence** of $\FF$, and this is denoted as:

- $\FF \vdash_{\mathscr P} \phi$

Note in particular that for $\FF = \O$, this notation agrees with the notation for a $\mathscr P$-theorem:

- $\vdash_{\mathscr P} \phi$

## Distinction between Logical Implication and Conditional

It is important to understand the difference between:

and:

When $A$ is indeed true, the distinction is less important than when the truth of $A$ is in question, but it is a bad idea to ignore it.

Compare the following:

\(\text {(1)}: \quad\) | \(\ds x > y\) | \(\implies\) | \(\ds \paren {x^2 > x y \text { and } x y > y ^2}\) | |||||||||||

\(\ds \) | \(\implies\) | \(\ds x^2 > y^2\) |

\(\text {(2)}: \quad\) | \(\ds x\) | \(>\) | \(\ds y\) | |||||||||||

\(\ds \leadsto \ \ \) | \(\ds x^2\) | \(>\) | \(\ds x y\) | |||||||||||

\(\, \ds \text { and } \, \) | \(\ds x y\) | \(>\) | \(\ds y^2\) | |||||||||||

\(\ds \leadsto \ \ \) | \(\ds x^2\) | \(>\) | \(\ds y^2\) |

We note that $(1)$ is a conditional statement of the form:

- $A \implies B \implies C$

This can mean either:

- $\paren {A \implies B} \implies C$

or:

- $A \implies \paren {B \implies C}$

instead of what is actually meant:

- $\paren {A \implies B} \text { and } \paren {B \implies C}$

Hence on $\mathsf{Pr} \infty \mathsf{fWiki}$ we commit to using the form $A \leadsto B$ rigorously in our proofs.

The same applies to $\iff$ and $\leadstoandfrom$ for the same reasons.

## Also see

## Sources

- 1980: D.J. O'Connor and Betty Powell:
*Elementary Logic*... (previous) ... (next): $\S \text{I}: 1$: The Logic of Statements $(1)$ - 1996: H. Jerome Keisler and Joel Robbin:
*Mathematical Logic and Computability*... (previous) ... (next): $\S 1.7$: Tableaus